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SUMMARY 
In this study, a rich dataset containing linked information on 
pension plans and labor markets in Japan was assembled to address 
several key research questions having to do with pensions and labor 
turnover: 
• Why are job turnover rates in Japan half those found in the 
United States? 
• To what extent are lower overall turnover rates due to greater 
pension coverage in Japan--over 90 percent of the male 
workforce--as compared to coverage rates of 50 percent in the 
United States? 
• How much higher would job turnover rates in Japan be if 
industry pension coverage rates were similar to those 
prevailing in the United States? 
• Can U.S. research findings on the relationships between labor 
mobility and the wage and pension benefit alternatives be 
replicated for the Japanese labor market? 
• Given a level of total compensation, are employers able to 
reduce labor turnover by varying the composition of wages and 
pension benefits — as predicted by theory? 
We addressed these questions using an analytic framework based upon 
implicit labor contracts theories. In this framework, pensions are 
viewed as a compensation instrument that employers use to reduce job 
turnover, induce greater investments in firm-specific training, and 
elicit greater worker effort. To evaluate the efficacy of these 
theories, we used data from several surveys conducted by the Japanese 
Ministry of Labor. Information on wages and turnover come from 4 cross -
sections of trip. Wage Cpnsns--1971 , 1976, 1981, and 1986. These surveys— 
were used to create a labor market dataset where the unit of observation 
is the age-seniority cell in 20 manufacturing industries and 3 schooling 
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groups. Associated with each cell are prospective 5-year job turnover 
rates, calculated by following synthetic cohorts of workers across 
survey years. These labor market data were linked, by industry and 
education, to information on pension coverage and benefit formulas 
contained in the 1981 Survey of Severance Pay Systems. The linked data 
were then used to calculate present discounted values of wages and 
pension benefit alternatives facing potential "leavers" and "stayers". 
Tabulations of the gross data revealed several stylized facts about 
job turnover, pension coverage, wages, and pension benefits in Japan. 
Like the United States, job turnover rates decline both with age and 
with years of seniority, as might be expected if early career job 
shopping is followed by strong job-attachment once a good worker-firm 
job match is found. More educated workers are also less likely to job 
change. Second, interindustry variations in pension coverage and job 
turnover rates appear to be negatively related—industries with low 
turnover rates tend to be those with the highest coverage rates, and 
vice versa. Third, job changers in general face sizeable wage penalties 
averaging about 12 percent of the wages of stayers; these wage losses 
rise with seniority, from about 4 percent for workers with short tenure 
to about 25 percent for those with over 20 years of seniority. Finally, 
in changing jobs workers face a potential pension loss averaging in 
excess of 20 percent—this despite receiving two pensions (from the 
current and subsequent employers) by leaving, as compared to one pension 
by staying until retirement. Furthermore, though the mean pension loss 
is relatively small (about 15 percent) for younger job changers, this 
figure can rise as high as 40 percent for older workers. 
We estimated grouped probit models relating job turnover rates to a 
set of control variables, measures of pension coverage, and the 
discounted present value of wage and pension benefit alternatives facing 
workers. Reflecting the broad patterns reported above, job turnover 
rates decline with education, age and seniority, though at a slower pace 
of older and long-tenured workers. The results also suggest that job 
turnover rates were higher in the 1970s than in the 1980s, in large part 
due to the workforce reductions that followed the OPEC induced oil price 
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hikes in the 1970s. We found evidence consistent with the predictions 
of theory, and with U.S. studies of pensions and labor turnover. Higher 
pension coverage lowers aggregate job turnover rates, and coverage by a 
combined severance pay and fixed-term pension plan reduces job turnover 
more than a retirement scheme offering either severance pay or a fixed-
term pension alone. Furthermore, job turnover rates are higher the 
larger are wage and pension benefit alternatives; however, job turnover 
rates are lower when more generous wages and pension benefits are 
provided by the current employer. Models estimated separately for 
younger and older worker samples yielded similar, though less precise, 
results. 
How sensitive are turnover rates to changes in pension coverage and 
benefits? We addressed this question through simulations based on the 
estimated model parameters. A 50 percent reduction in pension coverage 
results in a more than doubling of job turnover rates in Japan. When 
U.S. pension coverage rates by industry are substituted, mean job 
turnover rates in Japanese manufacturing rise to 35.7 percent, up from 
the baseline turnover rate of 22.6 percent. These simulation suggests 
that over half of the difference in job turnover rates between the two 
countries is attributable simply to differences in pension coverage 
rates; the remaining gap may be due to differences in the structure of 
wages or pension benefits. Keeping coverage rates at existing levels, a 
90 percent reduction in the pension benefits offered by all employers 
raises overall job turnover rates by 4.5 percentage points (from 22.6 
percent to 27.1 percent). For younger workers under age 40, the 
corresponding increase in turnover rates is much larger--8 percentage 
points (from 21.6 to 29.6 percent). Simulations based on reductions in 
current job benefits alone yielded much larger increases in job turnover 
rates, not surprising since benefit alternatives are constrained to be 
unchanged in other jobs. 
Finally, we evaluated the job turnover effects of wage-compensated 
reductions in pension benefits.—Much of the rationale for the implicit 
labor contract views of pension plans--that they reduce job turnover, 
provide incentives for worker investments in firm-specific training, and 
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motivate workers--relies on the maintained assumption that pension plans 
do indeed enhance worker productivity. Our simulations indicate that 
holding levels of total compensation constant, job turnover rates are 
higher the lower is the proportion of compensation paid as pension 
benefits--wage-compensated reductions in benefits of 90 percent raised 
turnover rates by 4.2 percentage points. In other words, within limits 
employers can effect lower job mobility (or higher job retention) by 
deferring a larger fraction of total compensation as pension benefits 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The reputed strong job attachment of Japanese workers is the 
subject of considerable academic interest to labor economists, and the 
envy of American practitioners of industrial relations. This interest 
stems from the widely-held view that longterm job attachment encourages 
skill acquisition, and that compared to Japan, high labor turnover in 
the United States has contributed to relatively slower growth in labor 
productivity. While there is some evidence that many jobs in this 
country are longterm jobs (Hall, 1982), overall rates of job turnover 
are nonetheless considerably lower in Japan than in the United States. 
Comparisons of 15-year job retention rates for males in the two 
countries indicate that job retention rates in the United States are 
half as high as those in Japan (Hashimoto and Raisian, 1985). Among 
Japanese male workers, 65 percent of those age 20-24 with 5 or more 
years of tenure and 73 percent of those age 25-29 were still with their 
original employer 15 years later. The comparable U.S. figures were only 
half as high--30 and 47 percent, respectively. 
To what are these country differences in job attachment due? 
Several, possibly related, explanations have been offered. First, 
Japanese employers may invest more intensively in the firm-specific (and 
non-transferable) skills of their workers (Becker, 1974). Evidence 
consistent with this specific training hypothesis is found in steeper 
tenure-wage profiles in Japan than in the United States (Hashimoto and 
Raisian, 1985; Tan, 1989). Empirically, however, this hypothesis is 
indistinguishable from competing incentive wage models--these do not 
rely on training arguments--in which steep wage profiles are used to 
deter shirking and to attract workers with intrinsicly lower turnover 
propensities (Lazear, 1979; Salop and Salop, 1976). Attributing steeper 
Japanese wage profiles to the greater use of incentive wage schemes is 
plausible only if transaction costs are relatively higher in that 
country than in the United States--a hypothesis for which no evidence is 
yet available. A third class of explanations--the subject of this 
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paper--is that pensions are used by employers to deter job mobility and, 
to the extent that they do, to induce job training and motivate workers. 
Since pensions are more widespread in Japan than in the United 
States--nearly 90 percent of Japanese males are covered by a retirement 
benefits scheme, as compared to pension coverage rates of just under 50 
percent for Americans--lower job turnover rates in that country might 
also be expected. 
Why do pensions reduce job turnover? Most pension plans tie 
retirement benefit amounts to both final year earnings and years of 
service in the firm. Benefits and years of service credits are also 
rarely portable across firms. Together, these features of pension plans 
produce strong incentives for workers to remain with the current 
employer because of the potential benefits loss associated with job 
change. Even without a rise in earnings over time, making benefits a 
function of years of seniority penalizes job changers since accumulated 
seniority is lost; rising earnings over time further amplify this loss 
because pension benefits are tied to final year wages. There is wide 
consensus, at least in the United States, that pensions affect worker 
behavior. A large body of work has documented the retirement incentives 
provided older workers by these benefit formulas, vesting requirements, 
and other plan provisions (see the references cited in Ippolito, 1986). 
Evidence on the effects of pensions on job turnover, though less well 
developed, also indicates that pensions inhibit labor turnover in the 
broader U.S. population (Shiller and Weiss, 1979; Mitchell, 1982; Wolf 
and Levy, 1984; and Allen, Clark and McDermed, 1988), and in England as 
well (McCormick, 1984). No comparable literature for Japan exists, 
however. 
The objective of this study is to investigate the role of pension 
plans in inhibiting job turnover in Japanese manufacturing. Japanese 
pensions differ from those in the United States in several ways. First, 
benefits may come from several sources--"taishokukin" or severance pay, 
"nftnkin" or a fixp.d-tp.rm pp.nsinn plan, or a combination nf thp. tun  
schemes. In the remainder of the paper, we will collectively refer to 
the different retirement schemes as pensions. Second, most benefits are 
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not annuities, but are instead paid as a lumpsum at job separation or at 
mandatory retirement. Most fixed-term pension plans also provide the 
option of receiving benefits as a lumpsum rather than as payments spread 
over a fixed time-period, typically 10 years. Finally, unlike the 
United States in the post-ERISA period, mandatory retirement rules in 
Japan are common and most workers are obliged to leave the firm 
(typically) at age 55 or 60. These differences aside, however, benefit 
formulas in Japan are structured very similarly to U.S. defined benefit 
plans in linking benefits to final year wages and job seniority. Do 
pensions in Japan affect labor turnover the same way? How responsive 
are Japanese workers to the potential wage and pension losses associated 
with job change? To what extent are cross-national differences in 
pension coverage rates and benefits responsible for observed lower rates 
of job turnover in Japan than in the United States? 
To answer these questions, we have assembled an unusually rich 
dataset for Japanese manufacturing containing information on pensions 
linked to aggregate labor market data by education and two-digit 
manufacturing industry. The labor market data come from the 1971, 1976, 
1981 and 1986 Wage Census surveys ("Chingin Sensasu"). These wage 
censuses report, by education and industry, the number and mean monthly 
wages of male workers in cells cross-classified by age and seniority 
intervals. Five-year job turnover are calculated by tracking synthetic 
cohorts of workers over the four census years. From the 1981 Survey of 
Severance Pay ("Taishokukin Seido Chosa"), we derive estimates of 
industry pension coverage rates--the proportion of male workers covered 
by "nenkin", "taishokukin", or a combination of schemes--as well as 
pension benefit formulas by education and industry. Together, these 
data allow us to estimate for the first time in Japan models relating 
labor turnover rates to worker attributes, industry pension coverage 
rates, and the discounted present values of wages and pension benefits 
in current and alternative jobs. 
Section II begins by outlining a conceptual framework for  
investigating the role of private pensions in job turnover. This is 
followed by a discussion of the job turnover model, and a careful 
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specification of the wage and pension benefit opportunities in 
alternative jobs. Section III describes the data sources on pensions 
and labor markets in Japan, and how empirical measures for the most 
important variables suggested by theory were developed. It also 
provides a broad overview of the stylized facts on job turnover, pension 
coverage, retirement benefits, and wages in Japan. In Section IV, the 
empirical results are reported. Evidence is found to support the 
hypothesis that pensions inhibit job turnover in Japanese manufacturing. 
Indeed, simulations suggest that over half of the U.S.-Japan difference 
in job turnover rates would be eliminated if U.S. industry coverage rates 
were substituted for those in Japan. Furthermore, the simulations 
indicate that wage-compensated reductions in benefits lead to higher job 
turnover. In other words, holding levels of total compensation constant, 
employers can affect job retention (job turnover) by varying the 
composition of wages and pension benefits. The main findings and their 
implications for public policy are summarized in Section V. 
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II. ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK 
This section discusses our analytic framework for investigating the 
relationship between pensions and labor turnover. Pension plans are 
viewed as one of several alternative deferred compensation schemes used 
by employers to cement worker-firm job attachment, and to ensure that 
workers leave when it is optimal to do so. With this discussion as 
background, a job turnover model is described relating the job-change 
decision to wage and pension benefits available in the current and 
alternative jobs. The definitions of these alternative wage and pension 
benefit measures are carefully specified to highlight the often strong 
assumptions made in many empirical studies on the subject. 
THE ROLE OF PENSIONS 
What role do pension plans play? Some scholars have attributed the 
historical growth of pension plans in the United States to the 
incentives posed by rising corporate and personal income tax rates.1 
However, early descriptions of pension plans in the United States point 
to a different set of incentives--reducing job turnover, promoting 
efficiency, and motivating workers: 
"if (pensions) prove ... effective in reducing turnover to a healthy 
minimum, in stabilizing the work force, in stimulating loyalty and 
efficiency, it is an excellent investment and an asset to the business." 
(National Industrial Conference Board, 1925, page 11) 
In Japan, the rise and spread of the traditional "taishokukin" or 
lumpsum severance pay system in the early 1930s was apparently also 
motivated by similar concerns, notably historically high rates of job 
turnover comparable to those prevailing in the United States today. 
While some Japanese firms set up pension plans in the 1960s and 1970s to 
1
 See Ippolito (1983) for a review of the different explanations 
for the growth of private pension plans in the United States. 
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take advantage of tax deductions afforded pension plans, many did so by 
transferring existing "taishokukin" reserves into pension plans. 
These personnel concerns are at the heart of implicit labor 
contract theories. These theories look at the way firms design 
compensation policies to reduce job turnover, promote job training, and 
motivate workers. In the presence of firm-specific skills, the promise 
of a longterm employment relationship can be used to induce optimal 
investments in firm-specific training benefiting both workers and 
employers in the form of higher wages and profits (Becker, 1974). 
Without such an incentive, there is excessive labor turnover and too few 
investments in on-the-job training. However, extending the promise of a 
longterm job to all workers can be costly since employers may not 
observe directly the innate productive characteristics of workers which 
are only revealed over time. Firms are also confronted with the well-
known agency problem, namely, the difficulty in monitoring the work 
effort of employees (Becker and Stigler, 1974). 
Some of these problems may be resolved by offering workers a 
longterm employment contract, specifying a compensation stream with 
years of tenure in the firm, as well as "penalties" if workers are 
caught shirking. Penalties could be in the form of forfeiture of a bond 
placed by the worker prior to employment. Alternatively, a worker's 
wage path in the firm could be structured so that it is lower than his 
productivity when he is young and higher than his productivity when he 
is old. In this case, the penalty for being detected shirking (and 
dismissed) is the loss of the "bond" implicit in the payment of initial 
wages less than productivity (Lazear, 1981). Yet another alternative is 
to use pension plans to defer compensation to the end of the work 
career. In this case, the penalty for early job separation is potential 
loss of pension benefits. Each of these schemes may be used to 
discourage turnover and to select, at entry, against individuals with 
high turnover propensities (Salop and Salop, 1976). Furthermore, worker 
incentives to stay with the firm grow with job tenure. This may  
encourage optimal investments in specific training and, to the extent 
that a steep wage profile solves agency problems between workers and 
firms, provide an added efficiency gain. 
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These alternative compensation schemes are illustrated in Figure 1. 
V(t) is the worker's productivity in the firm and R(t) his reservation 
wage profile. The date on which this implicit contract terminates is T. 
If the probability of the worker leaving the firm and the probability of 
the firm firing the worker were both zero, then any wage path that had a 
present value equal to the present value of the V(t) stream from 0 to T 
would be equally satisfactory to both worker and firm. However, given 
that the worker prefers to shirk rather than to attain output level 
V(t), the firm will find that wage profiles, like the one shown, W(t), 
will dominate paths that are either equal to V(t) or that fall over the 
lifecycle. Between 0 and t the worker earns less than his marginal 
product while between t and T he earns more. From t onward, he receives 
both capital and interest on the implicit bond placed between 0 and t, 
when he was working for less than his marginal product. For the pure 
bonding case, the worker gets a wage equal to his productivity profile 
V(t). However, the worker pays a bond B on joining the firm, which he 
gets back with accumulated interest, B*, when he leaves. 
Pension plans have elements of both the pure bonding and incentive 
wage schemes. The deferral of pension benefits (say B*) to the end of 
the implicit contract operates like the pure bonding case. Like the 
incentive wage scheme, pension formulas based on seniority and final 
wages create an "effective" wage rate W(t), of wages plus accumulated 
benefits, that grows rapidly with years of job seniority. To make this 
point more explicit, consider a simple defined benefit pension in which 
retirement benefits are proportional to years of service (S) multiplied 
by final salary W(S). Workers leaving at S < T, the ex ante retirement 
date, receives as of the deferred retirement date T, a benefit equal to 
-r(T-S) K.S.W(S)e , where K is a constant pension generosity factor and 
benefits are discounted from T to S at interest rate r. If the worker 
is thinking about staying one more year, the marginal pension benefit is 
Note that this accrued benefit is growing over time even though the 
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Fig. 1—INCENTIVE EFFECTS UF ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION SCHEMES 
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worker's wage may be flat over his career (W'(S)=0). If nominal wages 
grow over the life-cycle, the effect of the pension plan is to 
accentuate the rate of growth of total compensation. In other words, the 
wage incentive effects of a steeply rising wage profile can be achieved 
just as well by using a defined benefit plan. 
Pension plans may actually be a superior instrument for helping 
solve the agency problem. First, they do not have the tax consequences 
of a rising wage profile. If two workers have the same pre-tax present 
value of wages, the one with the flatter wage profile will have the 
lower post-tax wage. Since accrued benefits are not taxed, the firm can 
effect the same efficiency gains without increasing the worker's tax 
burden by deferring compensation in a pension plan. Second, unlike wage 
incentive schemes, pensions have the added feature of encouraging job 
separation (or retirement) when it is optimal to do so. If the shadow 
value of a worker's time exceeds his marginal product in the firm, a 
pure wage incentive scheme could deter what otherwise is optimal job 
change because his wage exceeds the shadow value of his time. For 
example, in the earlier figure, the shadow price function may rise after 
the worker has been with the firm for a while, say past t. This would 
make some other retirement date optimal, ex post, and yet the worker 
finds it not to his advantage to leave since his wage exceeds the shadow 
price function. 
The firm's pension plan provisions can provide an "early out" 
option that avoids this form of nonoptimal stickiness.2 Mandatory 
retirement provisions, which usually accompany pension plans, ensure 
that workers retire at the age when the present value of compensation 
(wages plus accrued pension benefits) exceeds their productivity 
(Lazear, 1979). Other pension plan provisions selectively provide 
workers with financial incentives to leave prior to normal retirement 
2
 Lazear (1983) has developed these arguments further and has 
tested them using Bankers Trust pension survey data. He finds that 
early retirement provisions have the feature of granting actuarially 
greater benefits to early retirees. While this clearly violates the 
view that pensions are meant to make workers adhere to their firms, it 
may be explicable in light of the role of pensions as severance pay. 
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age. These include early retirement, with smaller than actuarially fair 
reductions in benefits, as well as higher pension benefit schedules for 
employer-initiated separations as opposed to worker-initiated quits. 
Selective use of these plan provisions allow employers to obtain the 
desired workforce structure and "retire" less productive workers without 
violating the implicit labor contract. 
To summarize, employers confronted with problems of high job 
turnover, inadequate firm-specific training, and shirking will have 
incentives to defer part of worker compensation as pension benefits. A 
study of why different employers may vary in their incentives to use 
pension plans is beyond the scope of this paper.3 However, the 
employers that perceive these as important personnel issues will be more 
motivated to introduce pension plans or, having a pension, to increase 
the fraction of wage compensation paid as retirement benefits. They do 
so if the marginal returns to increasing pension benefits--lower labor 
mobility, increased job training, and greater worker motivation--
outweigh the costs of the additional pension outlays. 
This is illustrated in Figure 2 which depicts alternative isoprofit 
lines and a representative worker's indifference curve, both drawn in 
wage-pension space (Smith and Ehrenberg, 1983). When pensions have a 
neutral impact on productivity, the isoprofit line (00') has unitary 
slope. In this case, the employer is indifferent between alternative 
wage-pension mixes,- and the resulting compensation package is solely 
determined by workers' indifference curves. When pension plans reduce 
worker productivity (NN1), the pension-wage tradeoff is greater than one 
and employers have few incentives either to offer a pension plan, or to 
continue it if one was in place. Only when pension plans enhance worker 
productivity (PP*) is the pension-wage tradeoff less than unity. In 
3
 A companion study by Tan and Seike (1987) discusses alternative— 
hypotheses for why pension coverage and plan provisions may vary across 
employers. Preliminary evidence from Japan is presented, suggesting 
that firm size (small firms have a greater likelihood of exit), the 
cyclical variability in demand for an industry's output (high costs of 
hoarding excess labor in depressed periods), and technology-driven 
differences in skill-specificity (high-technology firms invest more 
heavily in their workers specific training) are important determinants 
of pension plans. 
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Fig. 2—WAGE AND PENSTON BENEFITS TRADEOFF 
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this case, the labor market clears with a compensation package weighted 
more heavily towards pension benefits. 
This last result suggests an indirect test for the economic 
rationale of pension plans. Holding constant total compensation, job 
turnover rates should be sensitive to the fraction of compensation 
received as pension benefits; indeed, job turnover rates (and shirking 
if agency issues are important) are predicted to decline if pensions 
have the productivity enhancing effect postulated by implicit labor 
contract theories. The specification of this test is elaborated on in 
the job turnover model to be discussed below. 
PENSIONS AND LABOR TURNOVER 
Consider the following model of job turnover in which the decision 
to change jobs depends only upon the discounted values of compensation 
in the current firm and that available in alternative jobs. For 
simplicity, we assume that pension coverage is universal (the empirical 
analyses control for pension coverage). If the most important 
components of compensation include the anticipated streams of wage 
payments, PVW, and the anticipated streams of pension benefits, PVP, the 
underlying quit function Y. can be expressed as: 
where the suffixes S and L refer to the current job and to alternative 
opportunities (including retirement). We do not observe Y., only an 
indicator variable y. for whether or not a worker separated from the 
current employer. Theory suggests that: 
The individual quits if current and future compensation alternatives 
(both wages and pension benefits) are greater elsewhere; otherwise, he 
remains with the current employer. 
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Most economists are in agreement about the broad features of this 
basic job turnover model, but not necessarily about its precise 
empirical specification. For computational convenience and, sometimes 
because of data limitations, a number of simplifying assumptions are 
often made. For example, Schiller and Weiss (1979) assume that the 
worker's wage alternatives depend upon the average earnings of like-
aged workers in manufacturing in the same geographic area. This wage, 
which averages over the underlying seniority distribution prevailing 
elsewhere, is unlikely to be a good measure of the wage alternatives 
facing potential job changers who stand to loose all accumulated 
seniority and, potentially, the wage increments associated with 
seniority as well. No attempt is made to measure the pension benefits 
in alternative jobs. In Allen, Clark and McDermed (1988), workers 
leaving the current employer are assumed to find another job with an 
identical pension plan, and experience the same wage growth path as 
before in the new firm. These are strong assumptions, as we will 
demonstrate below. 
Consider the wage alternatives facing potential leavers (PVW-L) and 
stayers (PW-S) employed at time t in a firm in industry k, where k=l to 
K. If retirement age is assumed (for simplicity) to be 55, then the 
alternative discounted present value of wages at time t+1 for workers 
age a with b years of seniority in the current firm are: 
PVW-Sabk = I1Zj W[a+i,b+j]fc.l/(l+r)1 (3) 
PVW-Labk = i V k ) . * 1 ^ W[a+i,j]k.l/(l+r)1 (4) 
where r = real discount rate 
W[a,b] = annual wage of a worker age a and tenure b 
1 = 1 to (55-a) 
j = 1 to (55-a) if stayer 
= 0 to (55-a-l) if leaver 
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k = industry 1 to K 
n(k) = industry k's share of the total number of workers 
age a+1 with 0 years of seniority. 
This specification of alternative wages relaxes many of the strong 
assumptions noted above. 
First, wages and wage growth are functions of both age (experience) 
and years of seniority, and the structure of earnings is free to vary 
across industries. There is ample empirical evidence in the human 
capital earnings literature to support this description of the wage 
distribution (for example, see Mincer and Jovanovic, 1981). Studies 
that assume away these empirical distributions miss important 
disincentives to turnover posed by such a wage structure, as becomes 
apparent below. 
Second, as a comparison of (3) and (4) makes clear, job turnover at 
time t is associated with the loss of accumulated seniority in the 
current job; in the next job (at time t+1), he begins to accumulate 
seniority again from 0. By age 55, stayers will have accumulated 
(b+55-a) years of seniority as compared to a maximum of (55-a-l) years 
for leavers. If there are added wage effects over and above the returns 
to age or work experience (for example, see Chapman and Tan, 1979), this 
loss of accumulated previous seniority can result in a substantial wage 
loss, especially if long seniority has been accumulated in the current 
firm. 
Finally, the alternative wage is the expected value of the wage 
streams received elsewhere by workers with the same attributes. This is 
simply the average of the discounted wages of like-aged job changers 
(those with 0 years of seniority), weighted by their employment 
probabilities in each job (industry). In (4), these weights are 
approximated by industry shares of the total number of new hires age a+1 
with 0 years of seniority. How likely are leavers to get new jobs with 
the same wage growth path?—Two factors mitigate against such a 
possibility: presence of firm-specific training and the costs associated 
with hiring and screening new entrants. Given the fixity of these 
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costs, employers will prefer to hire younger workers so that these fixed 
costs are amortized over a longer tenure in the firm (Hutchens, 1987). 
The "identical wage growth" assumption is particularly untenable for 
long-tenured older workers--few would freely choose to quit because of 
low wage alternatives elsewhere, which is consistent with age- and 
seniority-related declines in job turnover documented in the literature. 
Using the previous notation, the present values of pension benefits 
PVP for leavers (L) and stayers (S) can also be expressed as: 
where P[b] is the seniority-related pension multiplier used to compute 
pension benefits. For a worker age a with b years of seniority, the 
lumpsum value of benefits taken at time t is P[b]xW[a,b]. 
Equations (5) and (6) indicate that stayers (S) only receive 
pension benefits from the current employer while leavers (L) receive 
benefits from both the current and subsequent employers. As before, 
both are assumed to retire at age 55. At that retirement age, stayers 
receive a lumpsum benefit equal to the product of his final wage 
W[55,b+55-a] and pension multiple P[b+55-a]. Leavers at time t receive 
two benefit amounts: first, a lumpsum severance payment from the current 
employer--the first term of equation (6)--and second, the weighted 
average pension benefit received by similar-aged job leavers at age 55 
in other jobs. As before, weights are approximated by industry shares 
of the total number of similar-age recent job changers (those with 0 
seniority). All benefits are discounted at interest rate r back to time 
t--thft Iftayp.-Ktay dp.r.isinn point.  
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The loss of accumulated seniority b on the current job has two 
effects on the retirement benefits that workers receive. First, even if 
leavers join firms with identical pension formulas and remain on the 
same wage growth path as before, the sum of the two benefit amounts is 
always lower that the single pension they would get by staying. This 
may be illustrated by a simple example. Suppose a worker earns $100 at 
10 years of tenure and $200 at 20 years, with corresponding pension 
multiples of 10 and 20 times earnings. The single pension of $4000 that 
he gets by staying ($200x20) always exceeds the two pensions totalling 
$3000 that he gets by leaving ($100x10 and $200x20). Second, wage loss 
from job change amplifies the loss of pension benefits since a lower 
multiple P[55-a-l] is multiplied by a lower final wage W[55,55-a-l]. 
Together, these wage and benefits losses provide strong incentives for 
older long-tenured workers not to quit. These turnover disincentives, 
however, are likely to be less pronounced for younger workers, given the 
small pension multiples at low levels of seniority and heavy discounting 
of future benefits. 
To summarize, what are the predictions of theory about the job 
turnover effects of alternative wages and pension benefits? Assuming a 
probit model specification, we can express the basic job turnover model 
as (7), and differentiating yields: 
Prob(y .= l ) = 3.PVW-L. + £0PVW-S• + &0PVP-L. + £,PVP-S. + u . Ji 1 i 2 i 3 I 4 1 1 
= *(&'X ) + u± (7) 
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where $(.) and 0(.) are the distribution and density functions of the 
standard normal, and u. is assumed to have mean 0 and variance 1. 
l 
Equations (7-1) to (7-4) are the standard predictions of theory, namely, 
that the likelihood of job turnover increases the higher are wage and 
pension benefit alternatives, and falls the more generous are wage and 
pension benefits offered by the current employer. Together, these 
equations allow us to address a number of key questions. 
First, what are the effects of a reduction in pension benefits on 
job turnover in the labor market? Most empirical studies have focused 
on equation (7-4), interpreting 0(y.)&, as the job turnover effects of 
eliminating pension benefits in the current job. While strictly true 
for the individual worker, this result is conditioned on existing levels 
of pension benefits in all other jobs. As such, it cannot simply be 
extrapolated to the larger labor market since changes in one firm's 
pension benefits alters the distribution of expected benefits facing all 
potential job changers. Thus, getting at the labor market effects of an 
overall reduction in the level of pension benefits requires additional 
information on how job turnover is affected by alternative benefit 
levels, namely, 0(y.)$~ i*1 (7-3). Incorporating the effects of reduced 
pension benefits in all other jobs narrows pension benefit diffentials 
among jobs and, as such, might be expected to lower the overall 
likelihood of job turnover as well. 
A second question is can firms actually influence job turnover 
rates by varying the composition, but not levels, of total compensation? 
In the earlier overview of the role of pension plans, we discussed 
alternative theories about how deferred compensation schemes may be used 
to lower job turnover, induce more firm-specific training, and motivate 
workers (dissuade shirking). Evidence that deferred wage schemes 
enhance worker productivity, so that the returns to a dollar deferred as 
pension benefits are larger than a dollar spent today as wage 
compensation, would go a long way towards explaining employer incentives 
to set up pension plans.—Equation (7) permits an indirect test for the 
presence of these productivity-augmenting effects (and thus for the 
economic rationale of pension plans), using job turnover as a proxy 
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measure of productivity. In principle, given a constant level of total 
wage and pension compensation (PW-S+PVP-S=TC) in the current job, we 
can simulate the predicted turnover effects of wage-compensated 
reductions in pension benefits. That is, 
where only the composition of wages and deferred pension benefit varies. 
Equation (7-5) may be less than, equal to, or greater than 0, depending 
upon whether a larger fraction of total compensation in pension benefits 
reduces, has a neutral effect on, or increases job turnover. This test, 
it should be noted, does not directly address the issue of the relative 
efficacy of pension plans and wage-incentive schemes in which tenure-
wage profiles are "tilted" to make them steeper (Lazear, 1979 and 1981). 
Here, the productivity-augmenting effects of deferred pension benefits 
are implicitly compared to that of any pure wage compensation scheme of 
equal discounted present value. 
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III. DATA AND OVERVIEW 
In this section, we discuss the data and how empirical counterparts 
for the most important theoretical variables were created. Many of 
these variables — especially those pertaining to pension plans — are the 
first estimates of their kind in Japan. As such, this section serves as 
both a discussion of variables and a broad overview of the stylized 
facts on job turnover, pension plan coverage, retirement benefits, and 
wages in the Japanese labor market. 
LABOR TURNOVER 
Our information on turnover and wages comes from four cross -
sections of the Ministry of Labor's annual Wage Census--1971, 1976, 
1981, and 1986. The Wage Census provides aggregate tabular information 
on workers and monthly wages by two-digit industry and four schooling 
categories. For this study, we focus on the sample of male regular 
workers in 20 two-digit manufacturing industries and three schooling 
groups--graduates of junior high, high school, and college—for study. 
Within each industry-schooling category, tables cross-classified by age 
and years of seniority intervals report sample sizes and mean wages for 
each age-tenure cell. Most age and tenure categories are in 5 year 
intervals or, alternatively, in intervals that readily aggregate to 5 
years. Other categories—those that stretch into 10 years intervals or 
vary by survey year—are not so readily dealt with. A bivariate 
interpolation procedure was developed to estimate numbers of workers and 
wages for a common set of 5-year age and tenure intervals (see Peterson, 
Carson and Tan, 1988).x This resulted in 8 age (20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 
35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, and 55-59) and 6 tenure (0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 
15-19, 20-24, 25-29) categories. 
l
 Univariate interpolation is sometimes used to create (say) a wage 
series by single years of age from age-interval census data. Our data 
are more complex—wages are reported by age intervals cross-classified 
by years of seniority intervals. As such, we used a surface-fitting 
algorithm to generate this bivariate interpolation of wages by single 
years of age and tenure. 
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Using these 5-year age and tenure interval data, synthetic cohorts 
of workers can be tracked over the four census years to calculate 5-year 
job turnover rates.2 To see this, consider the 1971 sample of N[t] high 
school graduates in (say) the steel industry who are age 20-24 with 0-4 
years of seniority in the current firm. Five years later (in 1976), 
survivors of this cohort should be age 25-29 and have 5-9 years of job 
tenure with the same employer. The number of "stayers", N[t+5], is 
approximated (with some error) by the number of high school graduates 
with these latter age-tenure attributes working in the steel industry in 
1976. Those changing jobs sometime over this interval ("leavers") begin 
again with 0-4 years of seniority, either in the same industry or 
elsewhere in the economy. The 5-year prospective turnover rate is 
simply calculated as l-(N[t+5]/N[t]).3 Turnover rates were calculated 
in this fashion for each industry, education, and age-tenure cell, and 
for each pair of cross-sections: 1971-1976, 1976-1981, and 1981-1986. 
The final dataset of 4761 cells excludes the age interval 55-59, the 
25-29 years of seniority interval, and ths 1986 cross-section--they are 
used in calculating turnover rates but are themselves undefined. 
Table 1 summarizes these calculations by displaying prospective 
5-year job turnover rates by age and years of seniority. These are 
weighted means across industry, education, and years. The table shows 
that labor turnover rates generally decline with age, but begin to rise 
again for 40-44 year olds as they turn 45-49. Turnover rates rise 
dramatically for those age 50-54 (more than doubling for the long-
tenured in this age group), in large part because over the next 5 years 
many reach mandatory retirement between ages 55 and 60. With few 
exceptions, recent job changers (0-4 years of tenure) of all ages are 
more likely than others in their same age cohort to experience a 
subsequent job separation over the next 5 years. Job turnover rates for 
2
 Note that this obviates the need for several strong (probably 
untenable) "stationarity" assumptions for calculating turnover (or 
retention) from one cross-section of age-tenure data. See Hall (1982). 
3
 In several cells, N[t+5] exceeded N[t] because of sampling and 
measurement error. These cases tended to be concentrated in age-tenure 
combinations with small cell sizes, and were dropped from the sample. 
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Table 1 
5-YEAR PROSPECTIVE JOB TURNOVER RATES BY AGE AND JOB TENURE 
those who survive, however, are considerably lower. These patterns of 
job turnover are broadly similar to those reported for the United States 
(for example, see Allen, Clark, and McDermed, 1988), as are the overall 
lower turnover rates for more educated workers. 5-year job turnover 
rates by level of schooling attainment are 26.7, 20.3, and 17.9 percent 
for graduates of junior high, high school, and college, respectively. 
PENSION COVERAGE 
The data on pension coverage and benefits in Japanese manufacturing 
come from the Ministry of Labor's 1981 Survey of Severance Pay Systems 
("Taishokukin Seido Chosa"). This survey, of approximately 6000 firms 
with over 30 employees, elicited a wide range of information regarding 
their severance payments systems, including industry, firm size, age of 
mandatory retirement, type of pension system--lumpsum severance pay 
("taishoku ichijikin"), fixed-term pension plan ("nenkin"), or some 
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combination thereof—age and/or tenure restrictions governing receipt of 
pension benefits, and both wage and pension benefits for representative 
workers at different levels of job tenure (this last set of variables is 
discussed in greater detail below). 
This survey was used to estimate the fraction of male regular 
workers in each industry covered by each type of retirement benefits 
system. Survey weights were first used to adjust for the oversampling 
of large firms which invariably have a pension plan. A second round of 
adjustments were made to control for firm-size differences in the number 
of workers across industries, the fraction of the workforce that is 
male, and the ratio of "regular" and temporary workers. In contrast to 
their regular counterparts, temporary workers are employed on a short-
term basis without entitlements to any fringe or pension benefits even 
if such benefits are available to regular workers. These latter 
corrections were based on information developed from the 1981 Survey of 
Pension Receipts ("Taishoku Ichijikin Jittai Chosa"). 
Table 2 presents coverage rates by 2-digit manufacturing industry-
for each type of pension, as well as the fraction of the male regular 
workforce not covered by any retirement system. We distinguish between 
types of coverage because pension benefit generosity varies--on average, 
combined schemes (favoured by larger firms) tend to be more generous 
than either single pension type; of the latter, firms with only lumpsum 
severance pay tend to have more generous benefits than firms relying 
only on a fixed-term pension plan. Overall, it is clear that a very 
high fraction of male workers--well over 90 percent--are covered by some 
kind of pension plan. This may be contrasted to pension coverage rates 
in the United States of about 50 percent (Kotlikoff and Smith, 1984). 
Secondly, the fraction of the male workforce without pension coverage 
varies considerably across industries--from a high of almost 20 percent 
in the apparel industry to under 1 percent in the chemicals and 
petroleum industries. Finally, there are inter-industry differences in 
my&rago hy -t-ypp r>f rp.tirmp.nt. srhp.mp. Coverage by a combined scheme is 
highest (over 45 percent) in chemicals, petroleum, rubber and plastics, 
electrical machinery and transportation equipment--industries are 
dominated by large firms. 
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Table 2 
RETIREMENT BENEFITS COVERAGE BY MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
The final column of Table 2 displays the corresponding 5-year job 
turnover rate.for each industry. Like coverage rates, job turnover 
rates exhibit considerable variability across industries--ranging from a 
low of about 17.5 percent in chemicals, iron and steel, and non-ferrous 
metals to in excess of 30 percent in textiles, apparel, wood products, 
furniture, and leather goods. More to the point for this study, there 
exists a strong negative relationship between gross job turnover rates 
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and pension coverage rates. The same industries with low job turnover 
rates are the ones with the highest levels of pension coverage; 
conversely, industries with high job turnover exhibit the lowest pension 
coverage rates. 
WAGES AND PENSION BENEFITS 
We now turn to the estimation of alternative wages and pension 
benefits facing potential leavers and stayers. These variables are 
derived from monthly wage data reported in the Wage Census, and from 
information on pension benefit formulas contained in the 1981 Survey of 
Severance Pay Systems. Wages and pensions are calculated as the present 
value at time t of compensation streams cumulated from t+1 to age 55, 
the assumed age of mandatory retirement. A real discount rate of 3 
percent is used, and all present value estimates are expressed in 
inflation-adjusted 1980 yen. 
Wages of Leavers and Stayers 
To predict wages of leavers and stayers, we estimated simple wage 
models separately for each industry and education category.1* Wages, 
in 1980 1,000 yen, were regressed on quaratic specifications of age and 
tenure using the mid-interval age and tenure means as regressors. From 
the estimated parameters, real wages can be predicted for any age and 
k
 Several assumptions are implicit in these calculations. First, 
for simplicity, we assume that the job leaver finds a job in 
manufacturing rather than in other sectors of the economy. Second, we 
assume that job changers are reemployed without an intervening spell of 
unemployment. This simplifies calculations, but probably overstates the 
wage gain (understates the wage loss) from job change if the probability 
of unemployment and unemployment duration rises with age. Finally, 
leavers are assumed to remain in the next job until age 55. They may 
turnover again in t+2 if the subsequent job turns out to be a poor 
match, but that decision (at t+1) is independent of the prior job 
turnover decision at time t. 
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tenure combination. These include the industry- and education-specific 
wage stream of stayers who continue working with the current employer 
from time t+1 to age 55. For leavers, the alternative wage is the 
weighted average wage streams of recent job changers with 0 years of 
tenure in t+1 who are assumed to stay with the subsequent employer until 
age 55. These weights, which correspond to the expected probabilities 
of reemployment in other manufacturing jobs, are proxied by industry 
shares of the total number of similar-age and educated workers in 
manufacturing with 0-4 years tenure at time t. These alternative wage 
streams are then discounted back to time t using a 3 percent real rate 
of interest. 
Job turnover at time t is associated with loss of accumulated 
seniority in the current job. In the next period, leavers begin 
accumulating seniority again from 0. If there are added wage effects 
over and above the returns to age or work experience (see discussion in 
Section II), this loss of accumulated previous seniority can result in 
a substantial wage loss, especially at higher levels of job tenure. 
This latter point is demonstrated in Table 3, which presents the mean 
discounted present values of wages of leavers and stayers. 
Panels A and B of Table 3 display these discounted wages (in 1980 
million yen) by age and years of job tenure for leavers and stayers, 
respectively. On average, leavers can expect to get 45.4 million yen in 
retirement benefits (about $185,000 at current exchange rates) from 
staying, as compared to 51.1 million yen (about $208,000) from changing 
jobs, for a wage loss of 5.7 million yen (about $23,000). Panel C 
expresses the wages of leavers as a proportion of stayers' wages. At 
every age level, the mean discounted wages facing leavers are always 
lower than those of stayers. These discounted wage losses increase, on 
average, from about 4 percent for job leavers with 0-4 years of 
seniority, to about 25 percent for those with long job tenure in excess 
of 20 years. Thus, while some gain from job turnover, Japanese workers 
in general face sizeable wage penalties from job change. This potential 
wage loss, though often recognized, is seldom explicitly incorporated in 
extant empirical research on pensions and labor turnover. 
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Table 3 
PRESENT VALUE OF WAGES TO AGE 55 OF LEAVERS AND STAYERS 
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Pension Benefits of Leavers and Stayers 
The pension benefit formulas used to calculate pension loss 
associated with job change come from the 1981 Survey of Severance Pay 
Systems. In addition to firm size, industry, and type of retirement 
system (lumpsum severance pay, fixed-term pension plan, or some 
combination thereof), the survey elicited information on the firm's 
monthly wages and retirement benefits for "model" workers with different 
levels of schooling attainment. A "model" worker is a hypothetical 
employee hired directly upon schooling completion, who remains with the 
firm until mandatory retirement age. For each group of workers, the 
survey reports contracted monthly wage and the amount of severance 
payments at 10, 15, 20, 25, and 30 years of job tenure, as well as at 
mandatory retirement age. If there is a pension plan, either in 
combination with or as a substitute for the lumpsum severance pay 
system, the firm also reports the discounted present value of pension 
benefits at job separation (discount rates used are unfortunately not 
reported). 
Thus, for each firm, we know what retirement benefits are as a 
multiple of contracted monthly wages. Based on these data, we 
calculated mean pension formulas (averaging across types of retirement 
benefits) by years of seniority for each industry and schooling group, 
using sampling weights to account for interindustry differences in the 
size distribution of firms. We also incorporated information on pension 
multiples by school attainment for lower levels of seniority (3 and 5 
years of job tenure), using the Central Labor Board's 1981 Survey of 
Severance Pay, Mandatory Retirement, and Pensions ("Taishokukin, Teinen 
Sei, Oyobi Nenkin Jijyo Chosa"). Firms represented in this latter 
survey are large (over 1000 employees). This may lead to some over-
statement of the pension benefits available to the average short-tenured 
worker, but we believe that the biases are small given low pension 
multiples--2 to 3.4 times monthly wage. Next, separately for each 
industry and schooling group, we regress pension multiples on a 
quadratic specification of seniority. The estimated model parameters 
are used to predict alternative pension benefits for leavers and stayers 
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at time t.5 
Stayers only receive pension benefits from the current employer 
while leavers receive benefits (in most cases) from both the current and 
subsequent employer. Stayers are assumed to retire from the current job 
at age 55, at which time he receives a lumpsum benefit equal to the 
product of his industry and education-specific wage at age 55 and 
pension multiple of the seniority level attained at that age. Leavers 
receive two amounts--first, the product of his current monthly wage and 
pension multiple at his level of seniority; and second, the weighted 
average of pension benefits received by similar-aged job changers in the 
future at age 55. As before (see the previous wage calculations), the 
relevant weights are industry shares of the total number of similar-
age and educated workers changing jobs in manufacturing. Like wages, 
benefits are discounted to time t using a 3 percent real interest rate. 
Some leavers may receive less than two pensions in this 5-year 
interval because of vesting requirements in the current and alternative 
jobs. Vesting is the requirement that a minimum number of years of 
seniority (age requirements are sometimes used as well for fixed-term 
pensions) be attained to get a lumpsum severance payment or a pension 
from the employer. In the 1981 Survey of Severance Pay, the modal 
vesting period for severance pay is 3 years (in case of quits), and 
around 10 years for fixed-term pensions. We incorporate the effects of 
vesting in a crude, albeit realistic, fashion. Given the aggregate 
nature of our data, we simply assume that a minimum of 5 years of 
seniority is required to for vesting. This means that all stayers in 
our data receive a pension; over the next five years, they all attain 
seniority of 5-9 years. For leavers, we make the following added 
assumptions: 
5
 It is noteworthy that for the vast majority of cases, pension 
multiples appear to be a linear function of years of tenure (parameter— 
values for the squared-tenure term are by and large equal to 0). In 
other words, like U.S. pension formulas, benefit amounts in Japan are 
calculated by multiplying final year wages by years of tenure and a 
constant generosity factor (which may vary across firms). 
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(1) Age < 50 years with 0-4 years of seniority: Leavers receive 
benefits in the second job but have insufficient tenure to 
become vested on the current job. 
(2) Age 50-54 years with seniority > 4 years: Leavers receive 
benefits from the current job, but will have insufficient 
prospective tenure in the next job at age 55 to become vested 
for a second pension. 
(3) Age 50-54 years with 0-4 years of seniority: Leavers get no 
pensions because insufficient tenure (current and prospective) 
is accumulated in either job to become vested at age 55.6 
Table 4 reports the present value of pension benefits for leavers 
(Panel A) and stayers (Panel B) by age and seniority. Recall that most 
leavers not contrained by vesting requirements receive two pensions--
from the current and subsequent employers. Nonetheless, the sum of 
these two pensions is always lower than the single pension received by 
stayers. On average, workers who leave receive two pensions totaling 
3.47 million yen (about $14,000 at current exchange rates) as compared 
to a single pension worth 4.49 million yen (about $18,000) for those who 
stay--a mean pension loss in excess of 20 percent. As we noted earlier, 
there are two reasons for this pension loss--first, final wages at age 
55 are lower than those received by stayers (because of loss of previous 
seniority), and second, a lower pension multiple is used in the next job 
because fewer years of service credits are gotten in the time remaining 
to age 55. 
Panel C shows most clearly the magnitude of these pension losses at 
various age and seniority levels. Compared to stayers, pension loss 
from job change rises with age to a (local) peak of about 23 percent at 
age 40-44 before declining. It rises again for leavers age 50-54 who 
will not have acquired enough seniority to become vested in the 
6
 This is obviously true only in the 5-year interval in which they 
are observed. Older workers with 0-4 years of seniority in t are recent 
job changers, and may have received pension benefits from a previous job 
prior to entering our sample. 
Table 4 
PRESENT VALUE OF PENSION BENEFITS OF LEAVERS AND STAYERS 
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subsequent job. For a given age group, pension loss varies by seniority 
in a non-linear fashion--usually peaking at 10-14 years of job tenure, 
with relatively smaller pension losses at very low and very high levels 
of seniority. This non-linear tenure pattern reflects the combined (and 
not readily disentangled) influences of vesting, pension multiples, 
relative wages, and discounting. 
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IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, we report the empirical results of estimating 
models relating job turnover in Japanese manufacturing to pension 
coverage and the alternative wages and benefits facing leavers and 
stayers. Several model specifications were estimated using maximum 
likelihood grouped probit methods. In one set of regressions, we start 
with a simple model and sequentially add measures representing coverage 
and compensation alternatives. In a second set of regressions, we 
estimate models separately for young and older workers to compare the 
relative turnover effects of pensions and wages on different age groups. 
Estimated model parameters are then used to simulate the job turnover 
effects of changing pension coverage rates and benefit amounts for each 
of these samples. 
EMPIRICAL MODEL 
We estimate job turnover models using grouped probit maximum 
likelihood methods. In our data, the unit of observation X. is the age-
seniority cell in 20 manufacturing industries and 3 levels of schooling 
attainment, pooled over three census years--1971, 1976, and 1986--for a 
total sample size of 4671 observations. Associated with each X. cell 
are n. workers, m. change jobs over the next five years and n.-m. remain 
with the current employer. The empirical job change probability for X., 
p.=m./n., follows the normit: l I l 
G(p±) = §"1(pi) = 3'Xi + u ± 
and 3 G(Pi)/3 X ± k = <t>(p±)\ 
where $ and 0 are the distribution and density functions of the standard 
normal,—respectively,—and u .—are assumed to be distributed with mean 
zero and variance of one. The partial derivatives of G(p.) with respect 
to the k'th component of vector X are 0(p.)3, • These vary non-linearly 
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over the sample, and job turnover effects must be simulated for 
alternative values of X.. 
1 
In addition to job turnover, pension coverage, wages and benefits, 
the models also control for a number of other factors. See Table 5. 
These include indicator variables for schooling attainment (college 
graduates ommited), census years (1981 ommited), and years of seniority 
in the current job (20-24 years of seniority excluded). Age is 
represented by a quadratic specification, and by an indicator variable 
for workers age 50-55. Many in this age group will be observed to leave 
the firm on reaching mandatory retirement age between ages 55 and 60. 
We also include variables to control for the size distribution of firms--
the proportions of large and medium size firms (over 1000 and 100-999 
employees, respectively) in the industry, with small firms (30-99 
employees) as the ommited group. Larger firms, which have more generous 
retirment benefits and higher pay, are presumably also more likely to 
attract higher quality workers with low turnover propensities (see 
Hashimoto and Raisian, 1985). Finally, contemporaneous mean monthly 
wages (in logarithmic form) are used as a control for wage levels 
prevailing in the current job. 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
Table 6 reports the parameter estimates of a simple job turnover 
model with and without measures of pension coverage. Before turning to 
the turnover effects of coverage, we note that job turnover levels in 
1971-1976 and 1976-1981 are significantly higher than levels prevailing 
in the 1981-1986 period. These were periods of severe workforce 
retrenchments in Japan, brought on by the first and second OPEC oil-
price shocks of 1974 and 1978; in contrast, the most recent period was 
one of expansionary growth and overall job turnover rates were 
correspondingly lower. Job turnover rates in Japan are lower for the 
more highly educated, and they decline with age and seniority though at 
a s lnyp.r par.P fn r n l r lp r anrl 1 nng-tprmrp.H unrkf t rs . These a g O - t o n u r c 
patterns of job change are consistent with job shopping in the early 
work career, with strong job attachment developing once a good worker-
- 34 -
Table 5 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND MEANS 
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Table 6 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF A SIMPLE LABOR TURNOVER MODEL 
firm match is found. For the oldest workers (age 50-54), turnover rates 
actually increase again, in large part reflecting the attainment of 
mandatory retirement age. Turnover rates are usually lower in 
industries dominated by large firms because, as noted earlier, 
compensation tends to be more generous in larger firms. Finally, wage 
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levels in the current job are positively related to job turnover rates. 
This counter-intuitive result may be due to the presence of some 
unobserved variable(s), positively correlated both with wage levels and 
with job turnover rates.1 One source of correlation may be a higher 
layoff probability in high-wage jobs, as may have occured in industries 
severely affected by the oil-shocks, such as steel, aluminium, and 
shipbuilding. 
The second specification in Table 7 demonstrates that coverage has 
large inhibiting effects on labor turnover. We noted earlier that 
benefits available from a combined retirement scheme are usually larger 
than those provided by firms having just one system; furthermore, a 
severance pay system tends to be more generous than one providing only 
fixed-term pension benefits. This ranking of benefits by generosity is 
reflected in lower turnover rates when pension coverage is of the 
combined benefits type (-2.11) than when coverage is by fixed-term 
pensions alone (-1.74). Estimated coverage parameters are statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level; furthermore, the null hypothesis 
that the three coverage parameters are jointly equal to zero is rejected 
(F=7.31). Note that firm size effects become statistically 
insignificant with the inclusion of coverage measures, not surprising 
since they are highly correlated with firm size. 
Table 7 reports the parameter estimates for an augmented model that 
includes alternative wages and pension benefits, both expressed in 
logarithmic form.2 The estimated signs of both wage coefficients in 
specification (3) are consistent with the predictions of theory. Other 
things equal, job turnover rates are higher the larger are the present 
value of wage alternatives; the discounted wages of stayers have an 
equal and opposite effect on job turnover rates. Both wage parameters 
are estimated quite precisely, and are significant at the 5 percent 
level. Discounted pension benefits for leavers and stayers also have 
1
 A similar positive turnover effect of current wages was found by 
Allen, ulark, and McDermed (lyatt) using the National Longitudinal Survey 
of Mature Men. 
2
 Absolute yen specifications were tried as well, but the model fit 
was not as good as the logarithmic specification. 
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the correct signs predicted by theory--turnover rates are higher the 
larger are benefits available in other manufacturing jobs, while 
turnover rates decline with the generosity of benefits in the current 
job. However, only the alternative pension benefits have a 
statistically significant on job turnover at the 5 percent level. 
Specification (4) in Table 7 summarizes these results by including 
measures of wage and pension loss, expressed in log difference form 
(stayers relative to leavers). Estimated parameters of the wage and 
pension loss variables are both negative, confirming that job turnover 
rates are responsive to potential wage and pension losses from job 
change. 
Do pension coverage and wage and benefit alternatives have 
different effects on the job turnover propensities of younger and older 
workers? The U.S. evidence on age-differences in the turnover effects 
is at best mixed (see Schiller and Weiss, 1979). To test for the 
presence of age-specific effects, specification (3) was estimated 
separately for samples age 20-39 and 40-54. Estimated parameters of key 
variables are reported in Table 8 for the two age groups. The direction 
of effects of the coverage and alternative wage and benefit variables 
all have the correct signs. However, the precision of these estimates 
vary for the two groups--pension coverage is statistically significant 
at the 5 percent level for the younger workers sample, as are 
alternative wages for the older workers sample. In neither sample are 
statistically significant turnover effects of pension benefits found. 
SIMULATIONS 
How sensitive are observed labor turnover rates to changes in 
pension coverage and retirement benefits available in alternative jobs? 
Given the underlying model, proportionate changes in the regressors can 
have non-linear effects on the dependent variable. As such, we evaluate 
the predicted job turnover effects of percentage reductions in the 




LABOR TURNOVER EFFECTS OF COVERAGE, WAGES AND PENSIONS BY AGE 
We simulate changes in (1) pension coverage, (2) generosity of 
pension benefits, and (3) wage-compensated reductions in pension 
benefits. First, we lower overall pension coverage rates, with percent 
reductions distributed across the three types of retirement schemes in 
proportion to their share of total coverage. Second, holding wages and 
coverage rates constant, we vary the discounted present value of pension 
benefits available first in the current firm alone, and then in all 
manufacturing jobs. As we shall see below, these alternative 
simulations have quite different labor turnover effects (and 
interpretations). Finally, to see if the wage-benefits composition of 
total compensation matters, we evaluate the turnover effects of varying 
wagft-compensatp.ri rp.rlnr.tinns in pension hpnpfitSj holding total 
discounted present values constant. Simulations were conducted for the 
entire sample (A), and separately for young (Y) and older (0) samples of 
workers. 
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Panel A of Table 9 reports the resulting labor turnover rates from 
sequentially larger reductions in pension coverage. From the baseline 
figure of 22.6 percent for the whole sample (A), turnover rates increase 
by 5 percentage points (to 27.6 percent) for a 10 percent reduction in 
coverage rates, and more than doubles (to 51.5 percent) when coverage 
rates are cut in half. Similar reductions in coverage rates raise labor 
turnover rates more for the younger worker (Y) sample (from 21.6 to 52.5 
percent) than for older worker (0) sample (from 25.5 to 42.1 percent). 
How high would turnover rates in Japanese manufacturing be if 
industry coverage rates were similar to those prevailing in the United 
States? We address this question by substituting into our simulations 
U.S. pension coverage rates by industry, as reported in Kotlikoff and 
Smith (1984). With U.S. manufacturing coverage rates, mean labor 
turnover rates in Japan rise to 35.7 percent, up from 22.6 percent. We 
had noted in the introductory section that U.S. job turnover rates are 
twice as high as those in Japan. Thus, these simulations suggest that 
over half of the differences in U.S.-Japan labor turnover rates are 
attributable simply to differences in pension coverage rates. Part of 
the remaining gap may be the result of cross-national differences in 
early career job shopping, pension benefits, steeper wage profiles in 
Japan, as well as other societal norms and institutional factors. 
Panel B of Table 9 reports the results of reducing pension benefits 
while keep coverage rates at existing levels. Two sets of results are 
considered--one in which only benefits in the current job are varied, 
the other in which benefits are reduced in all jobs including the 
current one. In the first set of simulations, turnover rates for the 
entire sample (A) rise by 2.7 percentage points (22.6 to 25.3 percent) 
when current job benefits are halved, and rise by 9.5 percentage points 
when benefits are reduced by 90 percent. Reductions in current job 
benefits have more pronounced job turnover effects for younger (Y) than 
older workers (0). In fact, a 90 percent reduction in current benefits 
more than doubles turnover rates among the young worker sample (21.6 to 
45.3 percent), but raises older worker turnover rates by less than half 
again (from 25.5 to 32.4 percent). The latter turnover rates predicted 
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SIMULATED EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN COVERAGE AND BENEFITS 
for the two age groups should be interpreted with caution, given the 
imprecision of the benefit parameters estimated. 
These simulations, which are typical of most U.S. studies (for 
example, Allen, Clark, and McDermed, 1988), make little sense in 
aggregate models such as ours. Changes in current job benefits, if 
extended to the macro case, must by definition alter the distribution of 
expected benefits facing all other potential job changes in the labor 
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market. This point highlights a potential shortcoming in many existing 
micro studies. Predicted job turnover effects reported in micro studies 
implicitly condition on benefits being held constant in all other jobs; 
as such, they cannot be extrapolated to the labor market at large (this 
would tend to overstate aggregate turnover effects). Incorporating the 
effects of reduced benefits in all other jobs narrows pension benefit 
diffentials among jobs, and lowers the overall likelihood of job 
turnover as well. The second set of simulations--in which both current 
and alternative pension benefits are reduced--yield much smaller 
increases in job turnover. For the total sample (A), labor turnover 
rates are only predicted to rise 4.5 percentage points (from 22.6 to 
27.1 percent) when benefits in all jobs are reduced by 90 percent. The 
corresponding increases in turnover rates are 8 percentage points for 
younger workers and 3.3 percentage points for older workers. 
Panel C shows the turnover effects of wage-compensated reductions 
in benefits--benefit reductions are offset by equal increases in the 
present value of wages. These simulations are based on the view that 
pension benefits are a form of deferred compensation--workers Mpay" f°r 
benefits through reduced wage compensation. These simulations therefore 
allow us to ask a crucial question: holding constant total compensation, 
is job retention (and labor turnover) affected by the composition of 
wages and pension benefits? The answer appears to be a resounding yes. 
Consider the second set of predicted job turnover rates from wage-
compensated benefit reductions in both the current and alternative jobs. 
For the whole sample (A), a 90 percent reduction in benefits results in 
an increase in job turnover rates of 4.2 percentage points (from 22.6 to 
26.8 percent), holding levels of total compensation constant. With the 
caveats noted above, similar conclusions may be drawn for both younger 
(Y) and older (0) samples--a 90 percent reduction in wage-compensated 
benefits gives rise to increases in job turnover rates of 7.9 and 3.1 
percentage points, respectively. These simulations provide the first 
empirical support for the hypothesis that job turnover rates are 
sensitive to the proportion of total compensation received as deferred 
pension benefits. 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
We have assembled a rich source of Japanese labor market data 
linked with pension information to investigate the role of pension plans 
in labor turnover and job retention. We have sought to answer questions 
on why job turnover rates in Japan are twice as low as those found in 
the United States, whether Japanese workers respond to wage and pension 
incentives in ways consistent with those documented for American workers 
in the literature, and finally, if employers can influence job mobility 
by varying the wage-pension benefits composition of total compensation, 
as suggested by implicit labor contract views of pension plans. In this 
section, we summarize the main findings and discuss their implications 
for public policy regarding pension plans. 
Why are job turnover rates so low in Japan? One reason surely lies 
in the high proportion of the male workforce covered by pensions--over 
90 percent--as compared to just under 50 percent in the U.S. Testimony 
to the potential job mobility-inhibiting effects of pensions was found 
in a strong negative relationship between industry pension coverage and 
job turnover rates. Industries with low job turnover are those with 
high pension coverage rates--chemicals, petroleum, rubber and plastics, 
electrical machinery and transportation equipment. Industries with high 
job turnover rates—textiles, apparel, leather goods, wood products and 
furniture--typically have the lowest coverage rates in manufacturing. 
These interindustry variations in job turnover and pension coverage (by 
different types of benefit schemes) allowed us to estimate the effects 
of pension coverage on job turnover, holding everything else constant. 
We were thus able to ask the counterfactual question: What would 
Japanese job turnover rates be like if U.S. industry coverage rates 
prevailed? Our simulations suggested that mean job turnover rates in 
Japan would rise to 35.7 percent, up from the 22.6 percent observed in 
the sample. Thus, SI'TIPP II.S tnrnnvpr ratps are twir.P. tbor.o. of Jnpnn 
(see Hashimoto and Raisian, 1985), this result suggested that over half 
of the U.S.-Japan difference in job turnover rates is attributable 
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simply to differences in pension coverage rates. Part of the remaining 
gap is probably due to cross-national differences in wage and pension 
benefit structures, and to societal norms and institutions. 
How similar are the results to those reported in the U.S. 
literature on pensions and labor turnover? Descriptive tabulations of 
the data suggested that Japanese workers are responsive to economic 
incentives posed by the structure of wages and pension benefits. Like 
the United States, turnover rates are lower for more educated workers, 
and decline both with age and years of seniority in ways consistent with 
early career job-shopping followed by strong job attachment once a good 
worker-firm job match is found. The disincentives to job change can be 
quite substantial, especially for older, long-tenured workers. Using a 
real discount rate of 3 percent, we estimated that the potential wage 
loss (in present value terms) is about 4 percent for workers with short 
tenure and 25 percent for those with over 20 years of seniority. The 
potential pension loss from job change is even larger in relative, 
though not absolute yen, terms. The mean pension loss of changing jobs 
exceeds 20 percent. Though small for younger, low-tenured job changers 
(about 15 percent), this figure can rise to as high as 40 percent for 
older workers over age 50. 
Formal econometric estimation of these relationships yielded 
evidence consistent with the predictions of theory, and with other 
studies of pensions and labor turnover in the U.S. In addition to the 
pension coverage effects already noted above, the results suggested that 
job turnover rates are higher the larger are wage and pension benefit 
alternatives. However, turnover rates are lower when wage and pension 
benefits in the current firm are more generous. Keeping coverage rates 
at existing levels, a 50 percent reduction in pension benefits offered 
by the current employer raises overall job turnover rates by about 2.7 
percentage points (from the baseline of 22.6 percent to 25.3 percent). A 
90 percent reduction in benefits raises turnover rates by 9.5 percentage 
points for the sample as a whole.—Though tentative (because parameter— 
estimates by age group are less precisely estimated), this virtual 
elimination of pension benefits more than doubles job turnover rates 
among the younger sample of workers! 
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These results, however, are of limited value if the issue is how 
benefit reductions would affect overall job turnover rates in the labor 
market. To address this issue, turnover effects should be evaluated for 
benefit reductions both in the current firm and in all alternative jobs 
as well; otherwise, job turnover effects are overstated by constraining 
benefit alternatives to be unchanged, and thus exagerating pension 
differentials across jobs. The simulations yielded smaller predicted 
increases in job turnover rates when overall benefit levels were 
reduced. A 90 percent reduction in all benefits raised turnover rates 
by 4.5 percentage points for the sample as a whole; for the younger 
sample of workers under age 40, the corresponding increase was now 8 
percentage points (from 21.6 to 29.6 percent). 
Finally, we evaluated the job turnover effects of wage-compensated 
reductions in pension benefits. Much of the rationale for the implicit 
labor contract views of pension plans—that they reduce job turnover, 
provide incentives for worker investments in firm-specific training, and 
motivate workers--relies on the maintained assumption that pension plans 
do indeed enhance worker productivity. Our simulations indicated that 
holding constant levels of total compensation, job turnover--an 
indicator of productivity--is higher the lower is the proportion of 
compensation paid as pension benefits. In other words, within limits 
employers can effect lower job mobility (higher job retention) by 
deferring a larger fraction of wage compensation as pension benefits. 
These findings for Japan have implications for several recent 
pension plan initiatives in the United States.1 Some proposals--
requiring lumpsum distributions of vested benefits to terminated 
workers--should have little impact on the incidence of job changing 
among members of defined benefit pension plans. The proposed changes 
would, in effect, convert defined benefit plans into a lumpsum severance 
payments system not unlike the Japanese "taishokukin" system, or 
Lazear's model of how employers use pensions as severance pay (1981). 
Whether or not Mnrlcp.rs hpnp.fif from thpsp proposals will dp.pnnri 
1
 See Clark and McDermed (1988) for a discussion of these recent 
proposals and their potential labor market effects. 
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critically upon their ability to "beat the market" in investments of 
lumpsum distributions in (say) Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). 
Other pension proposals may have less neutral effects. Some have 
sought to offset the effects of inflation by proposing that vested 
benefits be tied to the projected earnings of working plan participants, 
rather than to earnings at job separation. Recall that part of the 
deterrent effect of pensions derives from the calculation of benefits 
based on nominal wages. In addition, effective in 1989, Congress has 
mandated lowering pension vesting requirements from 10 years to 5-year 
100 percent vesting, or 50 percent vesting after 3 years of service. If 
the implicit labor contract views of pensions are correct, these latter 
initiatives would (1) shift the burden of higher pension costs to 
employers and to those workers who stay, and (2) limit the ability of 
employers to shape the age distribution of their workforce. 
In implementing these pension proposals, policymakers should pay 
greater attention to the tradeoffs between the objectives of ensuring 
adequate retirement income for the aged on one hand, and the efficient 
operation of the labor market on the other. Proposals to limit losses 
in pension wealth and, thus, to increase worker mobility (when it is 
optimal) are desirable societal objectives. However, consideration 
should also be given to the question of why pension plans exist in the 
first place. If pension plans are instruments that employers use to 
reduce job turnover, to motivate workers, and to increase worker 
training, legislation that seeks to increase labor mobility and make 
pension plans more portable may ultimately work to the detriment of 
firms, and the workers that they were designed to benefit. The labor 
market component of this equation is highlighted by the Japanese 
findings that we have reported here, and by policy concerns that low 
U.S. productivity growth may be due to high labor turnover and 
inadequate worker training in this country. 
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